Translations of Original 855827 in Block Patterns
- Status of original: +active
- Translations: 16x current
No Context- Comment: Example site content, non-literal translation is ok
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- Added: 2022-12-01 02:11:50
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| ar | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | أهم منشور فلسفي لكريبك، <em>التسمية والضرورة</em> (1980)، استنادًا إلى نصوص ثلاث محاضرات ألقاها في برينستون في عام 1970، غيَّر مسار الفلسفة التحليلية. إنها قدَّمت أول قيمة مقنعة للضرورة والإمكانية كمفاهيم خارقة للعادة، كما ميَّزت كلا المفهومين الواردين من الأفكار المعرفية للمعرفة غير مكتملة الأدلة والمعرفة السابقة (المعرفة المكتسبة من خلال الخبرة والمعرفة المستقلة عن الخبرة، تباعًا) ومن الأفكار اللغوية للحقيقة التحليلية والحقيقة كثيرة الكلمات المركبة أو الحقيقة بمقتضى المعنى والحقيقة بمقتضى الواقع (<em>انظر</em> الاقتراح التحليلي). في سياق إجراء هذه الفروق، أعاد كريبك إحياء العقيدة القديمة للأصولية، التي بموجبها تمتلك الأشياء خصائص معيّنة بالضرورة - لن تكون الأشياء موجودة من دونها على الإطلاق. | Details | ||
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Arabic (ar)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. أهم منشور فلسفي لكريبك، <em>التسمية والضرورة</em> (1980)، استنادًا إلى نصوص ثلاث محاضرات ألقاها في برينستون في عام 1970، غيَّر مسار الفلسفة التحليلية. إنها قدَّمت أول قيمة مقنعة للضرورة والإمكانية كمفاهيم خارقة للعادة، كما ميَّزت كلا المفهومين الواردين من الأفكار المعرفية للمعرفة غير مكتملة الأدلة والمعرفة السابقة (المعرفة المكتسبة من خلال الخبرة والمعرفة المستقلة عن الخبرة، تباعًا) ومن الأفكار اللغوية للحقيقة التحليلية والحقيقة كثيرة الكلمات المركبة أو الحقيقة بمقتضى المعنى والحقيقة بمقتضى الواقع (<em>انظر</em> الاقتراح التحليلي). في سياق إجراء هذه الفروق، أعاد كريبك إحياء العقيدة القديمة للأصولية، التي بموجبها تمتلك الأشياء خصائص معيّنة بالضرورة - لن تكون الأشياء موجودة من دونها على الإطلاق. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| de | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Kripkes wichtigste philosophische Veröffentlichung, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), basierend auf Abschriften von drei Vorlesungen, die er 1970 in Princeton hielt, lenkte die analytische Philosophie in neue Bahnen. Es lieferte die erste überzeugende Darstellung von Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit als metaphysische Konzepte und unterschied beide Konzepte von den erkenntnistheoretischen Begriffen des a-posteriori-Wissens (durch Erfahrung erworbenes Wissen) und des a-priori-Wissens (erfahrungsunabhängiges Wissen) und von den sprachlichen Begriffen der analytischen Wahrheit und synthetischen Wahrheit, oder Wahrheit kraft Bedeutung und Wahrheit kraft Erfahrung (<em>siehe</em> analytische Proposition). Im Zuge dieser Unterscheidungen belebte Kripke die antike Lehre des Essentialismus, wonach Objekte zwangsläufig bestimmte Eigenschaften besitzen – ohne sie würden die Objekte gar nicht existieren. | Details | ||
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German (de)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripkes wichtigste philosophische Veröffentlichung, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), basierend auf Abschriften von drei Vorlesungen, die er 1970 in Princeton hielt, lenkte die analytische Philosophie in neue Bahnen. Es lieferte die erste überzeugende Darstellung von Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit als metaphysische Konzepte und unterschied beide Konzepte von den erkenntnistheoretischen Begriffen des a-posteriori-Wissens (durch Erfahrung erworbenes Wissen) und des a-priori-Wissens (erfahrungsunabhängiges Wissen) und von den sprachlichen Begriffen der analytischen Wahrheit und synthetischen Wahrheit, oder Wahrheit kraft Bedeutung und Wahrheit kraft Erfahrung (<em>siehe</em> analytische Proposition). Im Zuge dieser Unterscheidungen belebte Kripke die antike Lehre des Essentialismus, wonach Objekte zwangsläufig bestimmte Eigenschaften besitzen – ohne sie würden die Objekte gar nicht existieren. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| es | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | La publicación filosófica más importante de Kripke, <em>El nombrar y la necesidad</em> (1980), que es la transcripción de tres conferencias que entregó a Princeton en 1970, cambió el curso de la filosofía analítica. Fue el primer relato convincente de la necesidad y la posibilidad de los conceptos metafísicos , y distinguió los dos conceptos de la nociones epistemológicas del conocimiento a posteriori y el conocimiento a priori (conocimiento adquirido a través de la experiencia y conocimiento independiente a la experiencia, respectivamente) y de las nociones lingüísticas de la verdad analítica y la verdad sintética o de la verdad en virtud del significado y la verdad en virtud del hecho (<em>consulta</em> la proposición analítica). Durante la elaboración de estas distinciones, Kripke revivió la antigua doctrina del esencialismo, según el cual los objetos poseen necesariamente ciertas propiedades (sin ellas, no existirían). | Details | ||
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Spanish (es)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. La publicación filosófica más importante de Kripke, <em>El nombrar y la necesidad</em> (1980), que es la transcripción de tres conferencias que entregó a Princeton en 1970, cambió el curso de la filosofía analítica. Fue el primer relato convincente de la necesidad y la posibilidad de los conceptos metafísicos , y distinguió los dos conceptos de la nociones epistemológicas del conocimiento a posteriori y el conocimiento a priori (conocimiento adquirido a través de la experiencia y conocimiento independiente a la experiencia, respectivamente) y de las nociones lingüísticas de la verdad analítica y la verdad sintética o de la verdad en virtud del significado y la verdad en virtud del hecho (<em>consulta</em> la proposición analítica). Durante la elaboración de estas distinciones, Kripke revivió la antigua doctrina del esencialismo, según el cual los objetos poseen necesariamente ciertas propiedades (sin ellas, no existirían). You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| fr | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | La publication philosophique la plus importante de Saul Kripke, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980, La Logique des noms propres), recueil de trois conférences qu’il a données à Princeton en 1970, a changé le cours de la philosophie analytique. Cette publication fournit une étude novatrice des concepts métaphysiques de nécessité et de possibilité, et les distingue des notions épistémologiques de connaissance a posteriori (acquise par l’expérience) et de connaissance a priori (acquise en dehors de toute expérience) ainsi que des notions linguistiques de vérité analytique (ou de raison) et de vérité synthétique (ou de fait) (<em>voir</em> proposition analytique). Kripke fait ainsi renaître la doctrine de l’essentialisme, selon laquelle les objets possèdent certaines propriétés nécessairement. | Details | ||
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French (fr)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. La publication philosophique la plus importante de Saul Kripke, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980, La Logique des noms propres), recueil de trois conférences qu’il a données à Princeton en 1970, a changé le cours de la philosophie analytique. Cette publication fournit une étude novatrice des concepts métaphysiques de nécessité et de possibilité, et les distingue des notions épistémologiques de connaissance a posteriori (acquise par l’expérience) et de connaissance a priori (acquise en dehors de toute expérience) ainsi que des notions linguistiques de vérité analytique (ou de raison) et de vérité synthétique (ou de fait) (<em>voir</em> proposition analytique). Kripke fait ainsi renaître la doctrine de l’essentialisme, selon laquelle les objets possèdent certaines propriétés nécessairement. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| he | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | הפרסום הפילוסופי החשוב ביותר של קריפקי, <em>שמות והכרח</em> (1980), המבוסס על תמלול של שלוש הרצאות שהוא העביר באוניברסיטת פרינסטון בשנת 1970, שינה את מהלכה של הפילוסופיה האנליטית. פרסום זה סיפק את ההסבר המשכנע הראשון לכך ש'הכרח' ו'אפשרות' הם מונחים מטא-פיזיים, וביצע הפרדה בין המונחים האלה לבין המושגים האפיסטמיולוגיים של ידע א-פוסטריורי לבין ידע א-פריורי (ידע שהושג דרך ניסיון וידע שאינו תלוי בניסיון, בהתאמה) כמו גם בינם לבין המושגים הלשוניים של אמת אנליטית ואמת סינתטית, או אמת שנגזרת ממשמעות לעומת אמת שנגזרת מעובדות (<em>לעיון במידע על</em> הטענה האנליטית). במהלך קביעת ההבחנות הללו, קריפקי החייה את הדוקטרינה העתיקה של מַהוּתָנוּת (אֵסֶנְצִיָּאלִיזְם), הגורסת שבהכרח, יש לאובייקטים מאפיינים מסוימים; ללא המאפיינים האלה, האובייקטים כלל לא היו קיימים. | Details | ||
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Hebrew (he)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. הפרסום הפילוסופי החשוב ביותר של קריפקי, <em>שמות והכרח</em> (1980), המבוסס על תמלול של שלוש הרצאות שהוא העביר באוניברסיטת פרינסטון בשנת 1970, שינה את מהלכה של הפילוסופיה האנליטית. פרסום זה סיפק את ההסבר המשכנע הראשון לכך ש'הכרח' ו'אפשרות' הם מונחים מטא-פיזיים, וביצע הפרדה בין המונחים האלה לבין המושגים האפיסטמיולוגיים של ידע א-פוסטריורי לבין ידע א-פריורי (ידע שהושג דרך ניסיון וידע שאינו תלוי בניסיון, בהתאמה) כמו גם בינם לבין המושגים הלשוניים של אמת אנליטית ואמת סינתטית, או אמת שנגזרת ממשמעות לעומת אמת שנגזרת מעובדות (<em>לעיון במידע על</em> הטענה האנליטית). במהלך קביעת ההבחנות הללו, קריפקי החייה את הדוקטרינה העתיקה של מַהוּתָנוּת (אֵסֶנְצִיָּאלִיזְם), הגורסת שבהכרח, יש לאובייקטים מאפיינים מסוימים; ללא המאפיינים האלה, האובייקטים כלל לא היו קיימים. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| id | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Publikasi filsafat Kripke paling penting, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), yang didasarkan pada transkrip dari tiga pertemuan kuliah yang ia bawakan di Princeton pada tahun 1970, mengubah arah filsafat analitik. Publikasi ini untuk pertama kalinya memberikan penjelasan yang relevan tentang keharusan dan kemungkinan sebagai konsep metafisik , dan membedakan keduanya dari gagasan epistemologi yakni pengetahuan a posteriori dan pengetahuan a priori (pengetahuan yang diperoleh melalui pengalaman dan yang diperoleh melalui logika) dan dari gagasan linguistik tentang kebenaran analitik dan sintetis , atau kebenaran berdasarkan makna dan kebenaran berdasarkan fakta (<em>lihat</em> proporsi analitik). Dalam upaya membedakan hal-hal tersebut, Kripke mengangkat kembali doktrin kuno esensialisme, yang menyebutkan bahwa suatu objek harus memiliki sifat-sifat tertentu—tanpa sifat tersebut, objek tidak akan ada. | Details | ||
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Indonesian (id)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Publikasi filsafat Kripke paling penting, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), yang didasarkan pada transkrip dari tiga pertemuan kuliah yang ia bawakan di Princeton pada tahun 1970, mengubah arah filsafat analitik. Publikasi ini untuk pertama kalinya memberikan penjelasan yang relevan tentang keharusan dan kemungkinan sebagai konsep metafisik , dan membedakan keduanya dari gagasan epistemologi yakni pengetahuan a posteriori dan pengetahuan a priori (pengetahuan yang diperoleh melalui pengalaman dan yang diperoleh melalui logika) dan dari gagasan linguistik tentang kebenaran analitik dan sintetis , atau kebenaran berdasarkan makna dan kebenaran berdasarkan fakta (<em>lihat</em> proporsi analitik). Dalam upaya membedakan hal-hal tersebut, Kripke mengangkat kembali doktrin kuno esensialisme, yang menyebutkan bahwa suatu objek harus memiliki sifat-sifat tertentu—tanpa sifat tersebut, objek tidak akan ada. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| it | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | La pubblicazione filosofica più importante di Kripke, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), basata sulle trascrizioni di tre conferenze tenute a Princeton nel 1970, ha cambiato il corso della filosofia analitica. Ha fornito il primo resoconto convincente della necessità e della possibilità come concetti metafisici e ha distinto entrambi i concetti dalle nozioni epistemologiche di conoscenza a posteriori e conoscenza a priori (conoscenza acquisita attraverso l'esperienza e conoscenza indipendente dall'esperienza, rispettivamente) e dalle nozioni linguistiche di verità analitica e verità sintetica, o verità in virtù del significato e verità in virtù del fatto (<em>vedi</em> proposizione analitica). Nel fare queste distinzioni, Kripke fece rivivere l'antica dottrina dell'essenzialismo, secondo la quale gli oggetti possiedono necessariamente determinate proprietà - senza di esse gli oggetti non esisterebbero affatto. | Details | ||
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Italian (it)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. La pubblicazione filosofica più importante di Kripke, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), basata sulle trascrizioni di tre conferenze tenute a Princeton nel 1970, ha cambiato il corso della filosofia analitica. Ha fornito il primo resoconto convincente della necessità e della possibilità come concetti metafisici e ha distinto entrambi i concetti dalle nozioni epistemologiche di conoscenza a posteriori e conoscenza a priori (conoscenza acquisita attraverso l'esperienza e conoscenza indipendente dall'esperienza, rispettivamente) e dalle nozioni linguistiche di verità analitica e verità sintetica, o verità in virtù del significato e verità in virtù del fatto (<em>vedi</em> proposizione analitica). Nel fare queste distinzioni, Kripke fece rivivere l'antica dottrina dell'essenzialismo, secondo la quale gli oggetti possiedono necessariamente determinate proprietà - senza di esse gli oggetti non esisterebbero affatto. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| ja | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | 1970年にプリンストン大学で行った3つの講義の内容をまとめたクリプキの代表的な哲学書『<em>名指しと必然性 (Naming and Necessity)</em>』(1980年) は、分析哲学の流れを変えることになりました。 この著作は、形而上学的概念としての必然性と可能性に関する説得力のある理論を初めて論じ、両概念をアポステリオリな知識 / アプリオリな知識 (経験によって得られる知識 / 経験に依存しない知識) という認識論的概念と、分析的真理 / 総合的真理 (意味による真実 / 事実による真実) という言語学的概念から区別しました (分析命題を<em>参照</em>)。 このような区別を行う過程で、クリプキは古くからある本質主義の考え方を復活させました。これによれば、対象はある性質を必ず持っており、それがなければ対象はまったく存在しないというものです。 | Details | ||
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Japanese (ja)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. 1970年にプリンストン大学で行った3つの講義の内容をまとめたクリプキの代表的な哲学書『<em>名指しと必然性 (Naming and Necessity)</em>』(1980年) は、分析哲学の流れを変えることになりました。 この著作は、形而上学的概念としての必然性と可能性に関する説得力のある理論を初めて論じ、両概念をアポステリオリな知識 / アプリオリな知識 (経験によって得られる知識 / 経験に依存しない知識) という認識論的概念と、分析的真理 / 総合的真理 (意味による真実 / 事実による真実) という言語学的概念から区別しました (分析命題を<em>参照</em>)。 このような区別を行う過程で、クリプキは古くからある本質主義の考え方を復活させました。これによれば、対象はある性質を必ず持っており、それがなければ対象はまったく存在しないというものです。 You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| ko | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | 크립키의 가장 중요한 철학 저서인 <em>이름과 필연</em>(1980)은 1970년 프린스턴대학교에서 진행한 세 차례의 강의를 바탕으로 분석 철학의 진로를 바꾸어 놓았습니다. 필연성과 가능성에 대한 최초의 설득력 있는 설명을 형이상학적 개념으로 제공했으며, 두 개념을 사후 지식과 선험적 지식(각각 경험을 통해 얻은 지식 및 경험과 무관한 지식)의 인식론적 개념 및 분석적 진실과 종합적 진실, 즉 의미에 의한 진실과 사실에 의한 진실의 언어적 개념과 구분했습니다(분석 명제 <em>참조</em>). 이러한 구분 과정에서 크립키는 개체가 특정 속성을 필연적으로 소유한다는 고대의 본질주의 교리를 부활시켰습니다. 이러한 속성이 없으면 개체는 전혀 존재하지 않는다는 것입니다. | Details | ||
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Korean (ko)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. 크립키의 가장 중요한 철학 저서인 <em>이름과 필연</em>(1980)은 1970년 프린스턴대학교에서 진행한 세 차례의 강의를 바탕으로 분석 철학의 진로를 바꾸어 놓았습니다. 필연성과 가능성에 대한 최초의 설득력 있는 설명을 형이상학적 개념으로 제공했으며, 두 개념을 사후 지식과 선험적 지식(각각 경험을 통해 얻은 지식 및 경험과 무관한 지식)의 인식론적 개념 및 분석적 진실과 종합적 진실, 즉 의미에 의한 진실과 사실에 의한 진실의 언어적 개념과 구분했습니다(분석 명제 <em>참조</em>). 이러한 구분 과정에서 크립키는 개체가 특정 속성을 필연적으로 소유한다는 고대의 본질주의 교리를 부활시켰습니다. 이러한 속성이 없으면 개체는 전혀 존재하지 않는다는 것입니다. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| nl | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Kripkes belangrijkste filosofische publicatie, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), die gebaseerd is op transcripties van drie lezingen die hij in 1970 in Princeton gaf, veranderde de koers van de analytische filosofie. Hij leverde hiermee de eerste overtuigende uiteenzetting van noodzaak en mogelijkheid als metafysische begrippen, en onderscheidde beide begrippen van de epistemologische begrippen kennis a posteriori en kennis a priori (respectievelijk kennis verkregen door ervaring en kennis onafhankelijk van ervaring) en van de linguïstische begrippen analytische waarheid en synthetische waarheid, of waarheid op grond van betekenis en waarheid op grond van feit (<em>bekijk</em> zijn analytische propositie). Bij het maken van dit onderscheid blies Kripke nieuw leven in de oude leer van het essentialisme, dat stelt dat objecten noodzakelijkerwijs bepaalde eigenschappen bezitten, omdat objecten zonder die eigenschappen helemaal niet zouden bestaan. | Details | ||
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Dutch (nl)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripkes belangrijkste filosofische publicatie, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), die gebaseerd is op transcripties van drie lezingen die hij in 1970 in Princeton gaf, veranderde de koers van de analytische filosofie. Hij leverde hiermee de eerste overtuigende uiteenzetting van noodzaak en mogelijkheid als metafysische begrippen, en onderscheidde beide begrippen van de epistemologische begrippen kennis a posteriori en kennis a priori (respectievelijk kennis verkregen door ervaring en kennis onafhankelijk van ervaring) en van de linguïstische begrippen analytische waarheid en synthetische waarheid, of waarheid op grond van betekenis en waarheid op grond van feit (<em>bekijk</em> zijn analytische propositie). Bij het maken van dit onderscheid blies Kripke nieuw leven in de oude leer van het essentialisme, dat stelt dat objecten noodzakelijkerwijs bepaalde eigenschappen bezitten, omdat objecten zonder die eigenschappen helemaal niet zouden bestaan. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| pt-br | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | A publicação filosófica mais importante de Kripke, <em>Nome e necessidade</em> (em tradução livre, 1980), que tem como base a transcrição de três palestras ministradas em Princeton em 1970, mudou o curso da filosofia analítica. O livro foi pioneiro em apresentar com clareza a necessidade e a possibilidade como conceitos metafísicos , distinguindo-os das noções epistemológicas de um conhecimento posterior e um conhecimento prévio (conhecimento adquirido pela experiência e conhecimento independente da experiência, respectivamente), bem como das noções linguísticas de verdade analítica e verdade sintética, ou verdade em virtude do significado e verdade em virtude do fato (<em>confira a</em> proposição analítica). Ao elaborar essas distinções, Kripke revisitou a antiga doutrina de essencialismo, que prega que os objetos necessariamente possuem determinadas propriedades sem as quais eles não existiriam. | Details | ||
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Brazilian Portuguese (pt-br)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. A publicação filosófica mais importante de Kripke, <em>Nome e necessidade</em> (em tradução livre, 1980), que tem como base a transcrição de três palestras ministradas em Princeton em 1970, mudou o curso da filosofia analítica. O livro foi pioneiro em apresentar com clareza a necessidade e a possibilidade como conceitos metafísicos , distinguindo-os das noções epistemológicas de um conhecimento posterior e um conhecimento prévio (conhecimento adquirido pela experiência e conhecimento independente da experiência, respectivamente), bem como das noções linguísticas de verdade analítica e verdade sintética, ou verdade em virtude do significado e verdade em virtude do fato (<em>confira a</em> proposição analítica). Ao elaborar essas distinções, Kripke revisitou a antiga doutrina de essencialismo, que prega que os objetos necessariamente possuem determinadas propriedades sem as quais eles não existiriam. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| ru | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Наиболее важная публикация Крипке в области философии «<em>Именование и необходимость</em>» (1980), созданная на основе расшифровок трёх лекций, прочитанных им в Принстоне в 1970 году, изменила ход развития аналитической философии. В ней было представлено первое убедительное объяснение необходимости и возможности как метафизических концепций, и это отделило обе эти концепции от эпистемологических понятий апостериорного и априорного знания (знания, полученного через опыт, и знания, независимого от опыта, соответственно) и от лингвистических понятий аналитической и синтетической истины, или истины в силу значения и истины в силу факта (<em>см.</em> аналитическая пропозиция). Выводя эти различия, Крипке вернул к жизни античную доктрину эссенциализма, согласно которой объект обязательно обладает определёнными свойствами, без которых он не существовал бы вовсе. | Details | ||
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Russian (ru)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Наиболее важная публикация Крипке в области философии «<em>Именование и необходимость</em>» (1980), созданная на основе расшифровок трёх лекций, прочитанных им в Принстоне в 1970 году, изменила ход развития аналитической философии. В ней было представлено первое убедительное объяснение необходимости и возможности как метафизических концепций, и это отделило обе эти концепции от эпистемологических понятий апостериорного и априорного знания (знания, полученного через опыт, и знания, независимого от опыта, соответственно) и от лингвистических понятий аналитической и синтетической истины, или истины в силу значения и истины в силу факта (<em>см.</em> аналитическая пропозиция). Выводя эти различия, Крипке вернул к жизни античную доктрину эссенциализма, согласно которой объект обязательно обладает определёнными свойствами, без которых он не существовал бы вовсе. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| sv | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Kripkes viktigaste filosofiska publikation, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), baserad på utskrifter av tre föreläsningar han höll på Princeton 1970, förändrade kursen för analytisk filosofi. Den gav den första kogniska redogörelsen för nödvändighet och möjlighet som metafysiska begrepp, och den särskiljde både begreppen från de epistemologiska föreställningarna om posteriori-kunskap och priori-kunskap (kunskap som förvärvats genom erfarenhet respektive kunskap oberoende av erfarenhet) och från de språkliga föreställningarna om analytisk sanning och syntetisk sanning, eller sanning i kraft av mening och sanning i kraft av fakta (<em>se</em> analytisk proposition). Under loppet av att göra dessa distinktioner återupplivade Kripke den gamla läran om essentialism, enligt vilken objekt med nödvändighet besitter vissa egenskaper – utan dem skulle objekten inte existera alls. | Details | ||
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Swedish (sv)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripkes viktigaste filosofiska publikation, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), baserad på utskrifter av tre föreläsningar han höll på Princeton 1970, förändrade kursen för analytisk filosofi. Den gav den första kogniska redogörelsen för nödvändighet och möjlighet som metafysiska begrepp, och den särskiljde både begreppen från de epistemologiska föreställningarna om posteriori-kunskap och priori-kunskap (kunskap som förvärvats genom erfarenhet respektive kunskap oberoende av erfarenhet) och från de språkliga föreställningarna om analytisk sanning och syntetisk sanning, eller sanning i kraft av mening och sanning i kraft av fakta (<em>se</em> analytisk proposition). Under loppet av att göra dessa distinktioner återupplivade Kripke den gamla läran om essentialism, enligt vilken objekt med nödvändighet besitter vissa egenskaper – utan dem skulle objekten inte existera alls. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| tr | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Kripke'nin en önemli felsefi yayımı, analitik felsefenin rotasını değiştiren, Princeton'da 1970'te verdiği üç dersin deşifre metnine dayalı <em>Adlandırma ve Zorunluluk'tur</em> (1980). İlk güçlü zorunluluk ve olasılık doktrinini metafiziksel kavramlar olarak sundu ve iki kavramı da epistemolojik sonsal bilgi ve önsel bilgi (sırasıyla deneyim yoluyla edinilen bilgi ve deneyimden bağımsız bilgi) ve analitik doğru ve sentetik doğru ya da anlam sonucu doğru ve olgu sonucu doğru kavramlarından ayırmıştır (<em>bkz</em> analitik önerme). Bu ayrımları yaparken Kripke hangi nesnelerin belirli özelliklere sahip olması gerektiği — kendileri olmadan nesnelerin var olmayacağı antik temel esasçılık doktrinini hatırlatmıştır. | Details | ||
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Turkish (tr)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke'nin en önemli felsefi yayımı, analitik felsefenin rotasını değiştiren, Princeton'da 1970'te verdiği üç dersin deşifre metnine dayalı <em>Adlandırma ve Zorunluluk'tur</em> (1980). İlk güçlü zorunluluk ve olasılık doktrinini metafiziksel kavramlar olarak sundu ve iki kavramı da epistemolojik sonsal bilgi ve önsel bilgi (sırasıyla deneyim yoluyla edinilen bilgi ve deneyimden bağımsız bilgi) ve analitik doğru ve sentetik doğru ya da anlam sonucu doğru ve olgu sonucu doğru kavramlarından ayırmıştır (<em>bkz</em> analitik önerme). Bu ayrımları yaparken Kripke hangi nesnelerin belirli özelliklere sahip olması gerektiği — kendileri olmadan nesnelerin var olmayacağı antik temel esasçılık doktrinini hatırlatmıştır. You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| zh-cn | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | Kripke 最重要的哲学出版物《<em>命名与必然性</em>》（1980 年）是根据他 1970 年在普林斯顿发表的三篇演讲稿编写的，这本书改变了分析哲学的发展方向。 书里首次提供了作为形而上学概念的必然性与可能性的令人信服的陈述，并将这两个概念与后验知识和先验知识的认识概念（分别表示通过经验获得的知识和独立于经验的知识）以及分析真理和合成真理的语言概念（或称因含义而成立的真理和因事实而成立的真理）区分开来。（<em>请参阅</em>分析建议）。 在对这些概念加以区分的过程中，Kripke 复兴了古老的本质主义理论，这一理论认为物体必然拥有某些特性，如果没有这些特性，物体就根本不存在。 | Details | ||
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Chinese (China) (zh-cn)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke 最重要的哲学出版物《<em>命名与必然性</em>》（1980 年）是根据他 1970 年在普林斯顿发表的三篇演讲稿编写的，这本书改变了分析哲学的发展方向。 书里首次提供了作为形而上学概念的必然性与可能性的令人信服的陈述，并将这两个概念与后验知识和先验知识的认识概念（分别表示通过经验获得的知识和独立于经验的知识）以及分析真理和合成真理的语言概念（或称因含义而成立的真理和因事实而成立的真理）区分开来。（<em>请参阅</em>分析建议）。 在对这些概念加以区分的过程中，Kripke 复兴了古老的本质主义理论，这一理论认为物体必然拥有某些特性，如果没有这些特性，物体就根本不存在。 You have to log in to edit this translation.
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| zh-tw | Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. | 魁普奇最重要的哲學著作<em>《命名與必然性》</em>(Naming and Necessity, 1980)，係以 1970 年他在普林斯頓發表的三場演講的文字稿為藍本，此著作改變了分析哲學的進程。 這本著作將必然性和可能性視為形而上學思想，並首次提供強而有力的論據，將這兩個概念與「後驗知識」(透過經驗獲得的知識) 和「先驗知識」(獨立於經驗的知識) 的認識論概念區分開來，也說明了這兩個概念與「分析真理」和「綜合真理」的語言學概念 (也就是「以意義為真理」和「以事實為真理」) 兩者之間的差異 (請<em>參閱</em>分析命題)。 在區分的過程中，魁普奇再次提起傳統本質主義理論，該理論主張物體必然擁有某些屬性；沒有這些屬性，物體根本不會存在。 | Details | ||
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Chinese (Taiwan) (zh-tw)
Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. Kripke’s most important philosophical publication, <em>Naming and Necessity</em> (1980), based on transcripts of three lectures he delivered at Princeton in 1970, changed the course of analytic philosophy. It provided the first cogent account of necessity and possibility as metaphysical concepts, and it distinguished both concepts from the epistemological notions of a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge (knowledge acquired through experience and knowledge independent of experience, respectively) and from the linguistic notions of analytic truth and synthetic truth, or truth by virtue of meaning and truth by virtue of fact (<em>see</em> analytic proposition). In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. 魁普奇最重要的哲學著作<em>《命名與必然性》</em>(Naming and Necessity, 1980)，係以 1970 年他在普林斯頓發表的三場演講的文字稿為藍本，此著作改變了分析哲學的進程。 這本著作將必然性和可能性視為形而上學思想，並首次提供強而有力的論據，將這兩個概念與「後驗知識」(透過經驗獲得的知識) 和「先驗知識」(獨立於經驗的知識) 的認識論概念區分開來，也說明了這兩個概念與「分析真理」和「綜合真理」的語言學概念 (也就是「以意義為真理」和「以事實為真理」) 兩者之間的差異 (請<em>參閱</em>分析命題)。 在區分的過程中，魁普奇再次提起傳統本質主義理論，該理論主張物體必然擁有某些屬性；沒有這些屬性，物體根本不會存在。 You have to log in to edit this translation.
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